A Different Kind of Air Force
The forced resignation this week of the Secretary of the Air Force and the Air Force Chief of Staff--the ranking civilian and military overseers of the United States Air Force--was shocking and unprecedented, but it is widely being applauded. These leaders presided over the Air Force during two major lapses in nuclear security. In an age when too few senior military and government leaders face responsibility for their failures, Defense Secretary Gates has sent a clear message that he demands accountability from his people. This is a remarkable event in its own right, and has generated plenty of op-eds in major papers this week.
But there's even more to the story, which has ramifications for how the US military will transform itself to meet the needs of our changing world.
For the past few years, the Air Force has been facing what I call a "crisis of relevance." By adhering to narrow doctrine for strategic air campaigns against conventional enemies, by relentlessly pushing for expensive air-to-air aircraft designed to fight China (i.e. the F-22), and by virtually ignoring counterinsurgency strategy and acquisitions, the Air Force has alienated both its sister services and Congress. The Air Force seems increasingly out-of-tune with the world we live in; it is commiting the dangerous sin of preparing for the wars it wants, and not the wars it will actually fight. Yes, the Air Force has a responsibility to prepare for the next war down the road, even as Iraq and Afghanistan rage on; but the Air Force is convinced the next war will be a conventional conflict in Iran or China. It is not preparing for the myriad other "small wars" that are likely to dominate the next decade, just as they have the past two. The Air Force's vision (or lack of vision, as the case may be) has put the service at odds with the Army, Marines, and Navy, and most importantly with its civilian overseers.
Yesterday, Secretary Gate sent a signal that he may be about to change all that. He recommended Gen. Norton A. Schwartz as the new Chief of Staff--a transport and Special Operations pilot, the first non-fighter or non-bomber pilot to hold the post since the Air Force's inception. The nomination is widely viewed as a way to break the intellectual monopoly the fighter community holds on the Air Force. Secretary Gates seems determined to transform the Air Force's direction; perhaps sacrificing its next-generation air-to-air capabilities by reducing F-22 production, but bolstering unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and airlift capabilities. In short, making the Air Force more relevant by equipping it to fight in the turbulent, human-centric battlefields that have defined warfare in the past twenty years.
This move will not go down well in the Air Force. The critics--and there will be many--will be hysterical. Already, there is a sense in the Air Force that the service is in its death throes. Maj. Gen.Paul Selva, the Air Force's Director of Strategic Planning, warned last year about our "geriatric Air Force." On another occassion, Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynne said that the Air Force would soon be "out of business" unless Congress appropriated more funds to recapitalize its aging fleet. Many airpower theorists will believe we are committing national suicide by not investing more in expensive technology designed to fight China. Someday, they argue, that will come back to haunt us. Still others will worry that Gates' transformation is one more step towards the Air Force being reduced to a "support service" for the Army--something the Air Force has fought for decades to break free from.
These concerns all have some legitimacy, but on the whole, Secretary Gates is right. America's Air Force needs a change of direction. It is still clinging to Desert Storm as the golden age of airpower, and still training to fight that same war all over again. The Air Force will have a crucial role to play in future wars, but its declining relevance and its stubborn adherence to narrow strategic airpower doctrine will only hamper the Air Force in those wars--not help it. Secretary Gates has demonstrated courage and vision by pushing transformation.
But there's even more to the story, which has ramifications for how the US military will transform itself to meet the needs of our changing world.
For the past few years, the Air Force has been facing what I call a "crisis of relevance." By adhering to narrow doctrine for strategic air campaigns against conventional enemies, by relentlessly pushing for expensive air-to-air aircraft designed to fight China (i.e. the F-22), and by virtually ignoring counterinsurgency strategy and acquisitions, the Air Force has alienated both its sister services and Congress. The Air Force seems increasingly out-of-tune with the world we live in; it is commiting the dangerous sin of preparing for the wars it wants, and not the wars it will actually fight. Yes, the Air Force has a responsibility to prepare for the next war down the road, even as Iraq and Afghanistan rage on; but the Air Force is convinced the next war will be a conventional conflict in Iran or China. It is not preparing for the myriad other "small wars" that are likely to dominate the next decade, just as they have the past two. The Air Force's vision (or lack of vision, as the case may be) has put the service at odds with the Army, Marines, and Navy, and most importantly with its civilian overseers.
Yesterday, Secretary Gate sent a signal that he may be about to change all that. He recommended Gen. Norton A. Schwartz as the new Chief of Staff--a transport and Special Operations pilot, the first non-fighter or non-bomber pilot to hold the post since the Air Force's inception. The nomination is widely viewed as a way to break the intellectual monopoly the fighter community holds on the Air Force. Secretary Gates seems determined to transform the Air Force's direction; perhaps sacrificing its next-generation air-to-air capabilities by reducing F-22 production, but bolstering unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and airlift capabilities. In short, making the Air Force more relevant by equipping it to fight in the turbulent, human-centric battlefields that have defined warfare in the past twenty years.
This move will not go down well in the Air Force. The critics--and there will be many--will be hysterical. Already, there is a sense in the Air Force that the service is in its death throes. Maj. Gen.Paul Selva, the Air Force's Director of Strategic Planning, warned last year about our "geriatric Air Force." On another occassion, Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynne said that the Air Force would soon be "out of business" unless Congress appropriated more funds to recapitalize its aging fleet. Many airpower theorists will believe we are committing national suicide by not investing more in expensive technology designed to fight China. Someday, they argue, that will come back to haunt us. Still others will worry that Gates' transformation is one more step towards the Air Force being reduced to a "support service" for the Army--something the Air Force has fought for decades to break free from.
These concerns all have some legitimacy, but on the whole, Secretary Gates is right. America's Air Force needs a change of direction. It is still clinging to Desert Storm as the golden age of airpower, and still training to fight that same war all over again. The Air Force will have a crucial role to play in future wars, but its declining relevance and its stubborn adherence to narrow strategic airpower doctrine will only hamper the Air Force in those wars--not help it. Secretary Gates has demonstrated courage and vision by pushing transformation.


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