Israel-Palestine Through a COIN Lens

Israel's assault on Gaza continues into another day. I feel a little queasy reading the headlines each morning, because I'm flashing back to July of 2006. Israel has no doubt learned a thing or two from Lebanon, but I still don't see how this can end well.

I'd like to pose a question. The US military has learned relearned a tremendous amount about counterinsurgency strategy in the past few years. Successful implementation of an effective counterinsurgency strategy has made a world of difference in Iraq. So here's the question: if COIN experts applied all that knowledge to the conflict between Israel and Palestine, what would they conclude? If we set aside our passions and loyalties in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and assess the situation as objectively as possible, how would we evaluate Israel's long-term counterinsurgency strategy?

Viewed through one possible lens (of many), the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank can be viewed as insurgents against the Israeli government. There are two fundamental strategies for fighting an insurgency: annihilation or turning the loyalty of the people. Israel's long-term strategy has been a limited form of annihilation. When Palestinian violence flares up, the IDF uses military force to crush the source of the violence.

Strategies of annihilation raise both moral and strategic objections. Israel knows this well, because its most heavy-handed tactics draw strong international criticism. In his discussion of annihilation strategies, Nagl quotes the most recent British army's Counterinsurgency Manual:

"None of the attritional 'solutions' described above is appropriate in a liberal democracy and it is considered that a 'gloves off' approach to any insurgency problem has a strictly limited role to play in modern COIN operations. Furthermore, the record of success for attrition in COIN operations is generally a poor one. Undue focus on military action clouds the key political realities which can result in a military-dominated campaign plan that misses the real focus of an insurgency."

That paragraph might sum up the 2006 war with Hezbollah. Israel failed to achieve any of its major objectives. Furthermore, the war destabilized the region and worsened Israel's overall security. Hezbollah got a new lease on life as a resistance movement, Hassan Nasrallah emerged as a national hero, and the government of Lebanon nearly collapsed. Israel also lost moral capital and fueled resentment across the world.

The alternative counterinsurgency strategy--the strategy the US has employed in Iraq--is providing security and legitimate governance, winning the population's loyalty and eroding support for insurgents. This alternative is pragmatically and morally satisfying, because both the government and the majority of the people win. Nagl quotes a US Army officer:

"If the bulk of the band find they can live as decent human beings, do not have to rob to live, and can have land and homes, they will be poor guerrillas from then on. If the great mass of the population knows it will be protected by a strong, just government, it has no reason to cooperate with the guerrillas, and the system of intelligence and supply that sustains all guerrilla movements breaks down. Without popular support the mopping up of the hard-core die-hards is fairly easy."

This paragraph is telling, because the situation in the West Bank and especially in Gaza is almost exactly the opposite. Most Palestinians do not believe they will ever enjoy full human rights, their own land and homes, or just governance. There is plenty of blame to go around--corrupt Palestinian governance, neglect by other Arab countries, and internal extremism--but Israel shares a great deal of responsibility. When Israel continues building new settlements in the West Bank that violate the terms of any possible peace agreement, for example, Palestinian people have no reason for faith in a peaceful political resolution. Their loyalties will largely remain with insurgent/resistance movements.

Israel will no doubt win most or all of its tactical engagements in Gaza. It might even win an operational victory, and Hamas' control of Gaza needed to be challenged sooner or later. But it seems to me that the operation is occurring in a strategic and political vacuum. Applying the lessons of counterinsurgency doctrine, I see no way Israel can achieve a positive strategic outcome on its current trajectory. Both Israelis and Palestinians will continue to pay the price long into the future.

But I'm not trying to preach; I'm asking a question. What do you think?