Leadership in Aid and Development

I follow a good number of military journals and blogs. Most papers by military officers come from Lieutenant Colonels and above, and sometimes from Majors--probably because many of these papers spring from residency at Intermediate or Senior Developmental Education schools. From time to time, though, I'll find articles by Captains or Lieutenants. Because Captains and Lieutenants are not typically in staff jobs or schools yet, these authors are usually uniquely motivated individuals who have gone out of their way to write a paper. I'm always interested in what they have to say. For example, when I started paying close attention to counterinsurgency doctrine in early 2007, the handful of Air Force papers on the subject came mostly from Majors and Captains with unlikely backgrounds--like Captain John Bellflower, a former Marine who is presently a lawyer and who has two papers published on Small Wars Journal.

This morning I read a paper on Small Wars Journal by Capt Steve McGregor, titled Reconstruction in South Baghdad. McGregor describes the experience of Task Force 3-187 with aid and development in Baghdad in 2007 and 2008. He contrasts the military's approach to aid with the approach of the aid community, leveling several critiques against the latter. He also offers some lessons learned from Task Force 3-187's experience.

McGregor offers one "lesson learned" that is worth repeating here, because I think it's dead-on. He writes, "The Army possesses and develops better leaders than the aid community. As an institution the US Army relies on national service academies, Officer Training Courses, leadership schools such as Ranger School, and real-world experience, to develop leaders. Aid organizations as well as the US Department of State need to reevaluate how they prepare their staff for austere environments and the rigors of nation building or consider military exchange programs."

There is a broad consensus that our non-military instruments of power are in serious disrepair. The lack of institutional capacity to create leaders is a huge part of the problem. The US military has its problems, to be sure, but I've never seen another organization that consistently produces so many exceptional leaders.

The contrast with the State Department became painfully clear in November 2007, when State mandated service for Foreign Service Officers in Iraq to fill 48 open billets at the cushy embassy well within the Green Zone. Hundreds of FSOs protested. At a meeting, veteran diplomat Jack Croddy drew extended applause for one of the single most disgraceful and cowardly quotes I've heard from a government official: "It's one thing if someone believes in what's going on over there and volunteers. But it's another thing to send someone over there on a forced assignment. And I'm sorry, but basically that's a potential death sentence, and you know it. Who will take care of our children? Who will raise our children if we're dead or seriously wounded? Who will get our kids through life?" With one sound byte, a US diplomat simultaneously expressed opposition to American foreign policy, refused to follow terms in his employment agreement, and expressed both personal and institutional cowardice, in an appalling contrast to the tens of thousands of soldiers stationed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Is this the leadership we trust to tackle foreign affairs challenges? It's no wonder more and more foreign affairs responsibilities are being pushed towards the military.

The aid community is fraught with leadership challenges of its own. Just to cite one example, a former Peace Corps administrator wrote a critical article in Foreign Policy magazine in April about the organization's myriad problems. My wife, who served in the Peace Corps, tells me that the Peace Corps is heavily trying to recruit older, more mature people because they have so many problems with juvenile volunteers who abuse drugs and alcohol, violate cultural norms, and otherwise set a bad example of Americans to the world.

McGregor is right; aid organizations need reform, and they need good leaders at the helm.

When I reached the end of McGregor's article, I was intrigued when I read his bio: "Captain Steve McGregor received his commission from the US Air Force Academy in 2004. After one year in the Air Force, CPT McGregor cross-commissioned to the Army, completing Infantry Officer School and Ranger School. He then received an assignment to the 101st Airborne in the Fall of 2006. CPT McGregor recently returned from a 14 deployment to Yusufiya, Iraq with Task Force 3-187, 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). While there he served as a platoon leader and was then appointed to the S9—the primary battalion staff position responsible for Civil and Military Operations. At the end of his tour, Captain McGregor worked in the Policy and Plans Section of the Baghdad PRT helping to shape revision of the Joint Campaign Plan and coalition election involvement. Next year CPT McGregor is leaving the army to pursue graduate studies in Social Anthropology and a career in the US Department of State."

I'd love to sit down over a beer and hear his story. His career a snapshot of the complex, dizzying, cross-institutional world in which the US military now operates. I'm sure he will be a valuable asset to the State Department.