Messy Options in Gaza

It's been a disheartening week, watching the violence continue to unfold between Gaza and Israel. I've been addicted to the news and blogs, trying to make sense of the operation and its ramifications for the region. If my career continues on its current trajectory, it's possible I will be a Middle East policy adviser before too many years. Events like these give me a lot to brood over. If I was asked, what advice would I dare give my leaders?

The problem with foreign policy is that there are frequently no clear solutions to problems, and policymakers must muddle their way through bleak alternatives. Experts seldom agree with each other on the right way forward. This is especially true when it comes to Israel-Palestine, where everybody has a passionate opinion and interpretations of the conflict vary so widely.

One school of thought insists that the only long-term solution is a final negotiated peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Daniel Klaidman at Newsweek presents a succinct summary of where the peace process is at, and what a final agreement might look like. According to this school, the immediate task at hand is to negotiate a truce between Hamas and Israel and end the violence in Gaza, and find a way to get all players back into a long-term peace process. This short-term need is addressed in International Crisis Group's report Ending the War in Gaza.

A second school of thought argues that the peace process is a myth; Israel and the Palestinians are at war. Anne Applebaum argues this in The Washington Post. This reminds me of an article I read in a Conflict Resolution class, titled "The Curse of Inconclusive Intervention" by Edward Luttak. His thesis is essentially that wars need to blow themselves out; either one side needs to win decisively, or both sides need to so thoroughly weary themselves of fighting that they agree to negotiate an end. Outside interventions do not change the underlying problems or decisively end wars, so they inadvertently prolong conflicts. This school says that Israelis and Palestinians will continue to fight until one side actually wins (if that's possible) or until both sides are so sick of fighting that they mutually agree to sit down and have meaningful negotiations.

Of course, these are just two out of many different frameworks for viewing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and all the main ideas have infinitesimal variations.

Regardless of which of these alternative frameworks provides the best way forward, I stand by my thesis in my Israel-Palestine Through a COIN Lens post that Israel seems to be operating in a strategic vacuum. Several readers criticized my idea that population-centric COIN can apply in Gaza; a number expressed doubt that "hearts and minds" has any relevance in such a radicalized population. But Israel still has to wrestle with a terribly difficult question: if it weakens or crushes Hamas, who will rule Gaza in its place? Israel does not want to reoccupy Gaza. The ideal alternative (if it can be called that) seems to be restoring Palestinian unity under Fatah, but Israel's tactical victories in Gaza are devastating Mahmoud Abbas' legitimacy. Without a viable alternative to Hamas, Gazas may continue to give the movement their loyalty.

Crisis Group seems to share this concern. They write, "... Gazans of all political stripes believe that Israel is targeting civilians to turn them against the Islamic movement. They also think that any success in this regard likely will be shortlived, since when the dust clears, Hamas will still hold valuable cards: its religious appeal, its history of steadfastness against the occupation and most importantly, the lack of a viable alternative to their rule in Gaza and, more broadly, of any prospect for a viable peace with Israel."

Abu Aardvark gave me more reason for concern with his troubling post about Israel's self-admitted lack of strategic goals. After a lecture with Israel's ambassador to the US, Abu Aardvark wrote, "If Meridor is taken at his word, then Israel has no strategy in Gaza." When asked repeatedly about Israel's desired end state in Gaza, Meridor fell back on body counts and numbers of targets hit. I don't take that as a good sign.

If there is anything close to a consensus in all the articles I've read, it's that these are bleak times for Israel and Palestine. Many commentators feel Israel had no choice but to confront Hamas now, but few see room for optimism on the road ahead.