The problem with air-mindedness

Yesterday I praised Air Force Col Zastrow's call for an emphasis on jointness, in contrast to other Air Force articles that play up antagonism with other services. One of the key tenets of these articles is the concept of "air-mindedness." I think this word needs to be jettisoned from the Air Force's lexicon.

What does air-mindedness mean?

An article published today in Air University's The Wright Stuff is a perfect example. In Why does the nation need an independent air force? Dr. Muller writes, "What makes airmen different? Soldiers rightly see the close fight as the center of their universe. Airmen look beyond the front lines to the enemy heartland, to the sustaining sources of military, political and economic power, and even to the threat of the next war."

This view is the evolution of what airpower theorist Giulio Douhet once wrote: "As long as man remained tied to the surface of the earth, his activities had to be adapted to the conditions imposed by that surface. . . . By virtue of this new weapon [the airplane], the repercussions of war are no longer limited by the farthest artillery range of surface guns, but can be directly felt for hundreds and hundreds of miles over all the lands and seas of nations at war." General Hap Arnold coined the term "airmindedness" to describe the airman's unique view of the battlefield.

General Charles Dunlap, one of the Air Force's most prolific writers, often champions the concept of air-mindedness. In his most recent article he writes, "Actually, 'airmindedness' is more of an attitude that focuses not upon any one dimension of military power, but rather aims to holistically leverage America's technological advantages across multiple domains, especially (but certainly not exclusively) in air, space, and cyberspace."

Dr. Dale Hayden writes, "Air-mindedness... is a global, strategic mind-set providing perspective through which the battle­space is not constrained by geography, distance, location, or time. The air-mindedness lens enables Airmen to think about conflict in which force-on-force and armies in the field are only one element. It implies the ability to influence the links between adversary materiel and moral strength. Although Airmen rarely claim to target the enemy's will, they perceive a direct connection between his physical capacity and desire to continue the fight."

The core idea of "air-mindedness", in other words, is that surface operators view war as a 2D contest where armies collide at the front line; airmen think in terms of a comprehensive, multi-dimensional, unconstrained battlespace and are primarily concerned with strategic effects.

Why should we jettison the term? Two reasons.

First, I don't think it's true anymore. It was once upon a time. Airmen fought for decades to broaden the views of ground commanders and awaken them to the strategic effects airpower could create. I won't go into the story here, because it is well-documented by the airpower theorists at Air University. The story of airpower's difficult ascendancy finally climaxed in Desert Storm and the Balkans, where airpower proved its strategic utility. It is easy to see why early airpower advocates promoted the idea of "air-mindedness" and urged airmen to take a broader view of military conflict.

I think those days are largely behind us. The airmindedness theorists have a point--ground commanders do not always understand what air and space power are capable of, and there needs to be more mutual learning--but they are wrong that airmen have a monopoly on the strategic view of the battlefield. Afghanistan and Iraq have turned the tables. The US Army does not view these wars as a red vs. blue contests on a two-dimensional geographic battlefield. Army leaders see a complex, multidimensional battlespace. They understand these wars are waged in political, economic, military, and information domains. Tactical victories are less important than strategic effects. Nor are these wars limited to Afghanistan and Iraq; broader regional politics are immensely important. The keys to Iraq's and Afghanistan's future, for example, may lie with Iran and Pakistan. The Army did not develop this sophisticated understanding of the battlespace overnight, but it has proved remarkably adept at learning. Today you'll find soldiers and Marines of all ranks writing thoughtful essays about tribal engagement, the evolution of Islamic terror organizations, and the efforts of provincial reconstruction teams, among other things.

The Air Force has tended to lag. I was deeply alarmed when a senior AFCENT general gave a briefing at the base I was deployed in 2007, full of the metrics he was relying on and was obviously proud of: sorties flown, bombs dropped, targets destroyed. His view of the war, I thought, was far too narrow. Very few Air Force officers regularly engage with the vibrant discussions of war and strategy online. The Air Force has made great strides in improving its understanding of irregular warfare since 2007, but I see no indication that the Air Force by definition has a more strategic view of war than the Army.

The second reason we should jettison the phrase "air-mindedness" is that nobody is listening. It's a term and concept that only circulates within the ranks of the Air Force. Mention it around the Army, and you'll probably hear snide comments about "air-headedness" and the Air Force's irrelevance. This interservice rivalry has two sides, and plenty of soldiers and Marines are guilty of ignoring or downplaying the Air Force's crucial contributions to our present wars, but the elitist view of air-mindedness will not close the gap. Far better to start from a platform of cooperation and equality, and clearly and professionally articulate what airpower can contribute. Lt Col Kelly "K Mart" Martin sets a good example with her piece at Tom Ricks' blog.