tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1673747533541391425.post452419743605968582..comments2009-07-02T16:15:56.626+03:00Mark Jacobsenhttps://profiles.google.com/107999162787819355839noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1673747533541391425.post-46073151050898498122009-07-02T16:14:05.434+03:002009-07-02T16:14:05.434+03:00You were assured Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) would be more rigorous... My guess is you may find that in residence. You will not find it in the ACSC/DL program, though. As you&#39;ve seen mentioned on my blog, ACSC/DL does not inspire critical thought. In fact, it denies academic freedom and actively punishes unpopular viewpoints. That isn&#39;t to say there are no useful parts to the program...there are but they are very few and don&#39;t come close to balancing the negative aspects in my experience. I have one term remaining in the program and am almost done. Just waiting to spend more time on my thesis.<br /><br />I am of the opinion the ACSC/DL program needs a major reform effort and my concerns are in part being worked at the AU/CC level.PickYourBattleshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16448529287854593110noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1673747533541391425.post-28144143488970935652009-05-26T18:11:27.661+03:002009-05-26T18:11:27.661+03:00Perhaps one of the less obvious problems with the whole situation is the way in which promotion boards frown upon those with training tours. How many ROTC instructors do you know that have gotten passed over? We intentionally hamstring ourselves by not making training our replacements as vital of a mission as other aspects. In doing so, we do a continued and perpetual disservice to the Air Force. For example, in acquisitions, after 7 years, I'm yet to really have a supervisor pay more than lip service to training. <br />I am still perpetually amazed at how little relevance SOS has with anything in the Air Force. What's worse is the fact that the distinguished graduate program is designed to reward those that can make themselves fit into a mold. It's not about adaptability. It's about being able to think the way you're told to think. Those who take risks are ridiculed by their flight, further normalizing this ridiculous culture of risk aversion that has already saturated our Air Force. Of course, by tying distinguished graduate criteria with the ability to "drink the Kool-Aid", we only allow the best conformists to reach the top. While conformism is a virtue to some degree in the military, once it becomes paralyzing, it only serves to cripple our armed forces intellectually. <br />As anecdotal evidence of the saturation of a culture of ignorance, I was lamenting this to a mentor, an AWC student. "Sir, my flight hates me because I use big words. It's like high school."<br />"Son, it gets worse once you get to AWC."<br /><br />At this point, I think that the best thing any of us can do is valiantly attempt to institute change where we can and network to share ideas in small groups. It's only through banding together with a common vision of innovation that we can turn the tide.Gizmonoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1673747533541391425.post-45291436834680700922009-01-19T05:53:00.000+02:002009-01-19T05:53:00.000+02:00Thanks for the good thoughts. I was impressed with Nagl's challenge and hope that we can too can challenge the current service culture.Ben Jhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03727107756181251150noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1673747533541391425.post-4945631528482563182009-01-09T03:32:00.000+02:002009-01-09T03:32:00.000+02:00Good point. The Air Force and Navy don't need to transform themselves into strictly COIN forces, and they don't need to try to imitate the Army or Marines. The Air Force is very different from its sister services, and will always have its own capabilities and priorities. These will largely be kinetic.<BR/><BR/>With that said, I still believe Air Force officers need to understand the broader strategic context in which they're fighting. Very little in my PME training has given me that, and some of the doctrine may even be counterproductive. If I recall, my SOS in-residence curriculum included only one hour on post-Desert Storm airpower, and it was primarily about changing operational uses of airpower (i.e. B-52s flying CAS). There was no discussion of strategy in Afghanistan or Iraq.<BR/><BR/>When Air Force officers are only groomed to fight a conventional strategic air campaign, there will be powerful institutional tendencies to approach every conflict the same way, to oversell airpower's capabilities, and to misunderstand the fundamental objectives of the war. The Air Force's kinetic capabilities are still extremely important in counterinsurgency, but it's vital that Air Force officers understand how it's to be employed.Reach 364http://www.blogger.com/profile/03529267584917166328noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1673747533541391425.post-71804289660119939992009-01-09T02:45:00.000+02:002009-01-09T02:45:00.000+02:00Present fight vs. future fight:<BR/><BR/>How do the Air Force and Navy adapt their force structures to COIN, specifically? Doing so in any meaningful way would require them to become subservient to the Army and Marines in a big way at the present time. I am guessing that the senior leaders of those services would say that such a move would cripple them in the future fight. Force-on-force kinetic operations is their thing. Would making them a tool of COIN practitioners not require them to wholly revisit their current equipment and manning requirements? Doing so might be short-sighted on a service-wide basis unless you are talking about academic exercises only. <BR/><BR/>I have to read Dr. Nagl's book to make sure I'm not speaking out of my 4th point of contact, but while doctrine can change and evolve very quickly (education and all), I think proper training, equipping, and fielding based on the current fight could be dangerous.da kinehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10291006601316234458noreply@blogger.com